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ALASKA’S JUDICIAL RETENTION 
ELECTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
ALBERT J. KLUMPP* 
ABSTRACT 
The results of recent judicial retention elections in Alaska, and the recent 
increase in political activities related to judicial selection in Alaska and many 
other states, have given rise to concerns about the fates of future Alaska 
retention candidates. This Article analyzes the results of retention elections 
nationwide and suggests that there may be good reason for Alaska judges to be 
worried. Baseline levels of voter support for retention candidates in most of 
Alaska are among the lowest in the country, and have gradually been declining 
over time. In addition, Alaskan voters have targeted individual judges for 
removal more frequently than voters in most other states. This Article’s 
analysis indicates that ensuring the retention of competent Alaska judges in 
the future requires more than simply improving the effectiveness of pro-
retention campaigns for individual candidates, and that understanding and 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2017, as part of its annual convention, the Alaska Bar hosted 
a CLE program that may well have been the first of its kind anywhere in 
the United States. The program—”The Changing National Landscape in 
Judicial Retention and its Implications for Alaska”—was essentially a 
how-to guide for dealing with judicial retention elections and the 
opposition that can arise against a judge seeking retention.1 It addressed 
ethical issues and conflict-of-interest questions facing retention 
candidates and potential supporters and opponents, discussed the extent 
to which judges can campaign on their own behalf and solicit outside 
assistance, and shared stories of successful retention campaigns and the 
strategies that those campaigns employed.2 
The program was a result of concerns over two recent events. One 
was a 2014 attempt to enact an amendment to the state constitution’s 
judicial article.3 The amendment would have drastically altered the 
Alaska Judicial Council, giving the state’s governor the power to appoint 
the majority of its members and thus greatly expand the governor’s 
influence over the selection of new judges.4 The proposal fell just short of 
passage in the state senate, and while its near-term prospects for adoption 
have faded substantially,5 the opposition effort that it generated continues 
to remain active.6 In fact, the CLE program itself was produced by Justice 
Not Politics Alaska, a citizen organization that was formed in the wake of 
the proposal and that continues to advocate in favor of the current judicial 
selection system.7 
 
 1.  Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Panel Discussion at the Alaska Bar Association 
2017 Annual Convention: The Changing National Landscape in Judicial Retention 
and its Implication for Alaska (May 10, 2017). 
 2.  See generally Audio recording: Conference on The Changing National 
Landscape in Judicial Retention and its Implications for Alaska, held by the 
Alaska Bar Association (May 10, 2017) [hereinafter CLE Program recording on 
Judicial Retention] (on file with author). 
 3.  S.J.R. 21, 28th Leg., 2d. Sess. (Alaska 2014). 
 4.  See Michael L. Boyer, The State Courts and Alaska Politics: Independence, 
Public Accountability, and Political Influence, in ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
THE DYNAMICS OF BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND POWER, 605, 619−20 
(Clive S. Thomas et al. eds., 2016) (describing proposed amendment). 
 5.  CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2. 
 6.  See Dermot Cole, Senate Scraps Plan to Double Governor’s Picks on Council 
for Judge Nominees, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 12, 2014), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/article/senate-withdraws-plan-give-governor-
more-influence-picking-alaska-judges/2014/04/13/ (noting opponents of 
amendment, many of whom are still important stakeholders as of this writing); 
see also CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2, at 2:05.  
 7.  Robert Woolsey, Lawyers Advocate to Keep Politics Out of Judge Selection, 
KCAW (Sep. 17, 2015), https://www.kcaw.org/2015/09/17/lawyers-advocate-
to-keep-politics-out-of-judge-selection/. 
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The other event of concern was the 2016 Alaska general election, 
specifically the low voter approval rates for judicial retention candidates.8 
Walter “Bud” Carpeneti, former chief justice of the Alaska Supreme 
Court, summarized this concern in his introductory remarks at the CLE 
program: 
In the 2016 election cycle, some results in Alaska’s judicial 
retention elections caused many observers to wonder if our 
constitutional merit system is vulnerable to the possibility that 
coordinated non-retention campaigns against competent and 
qualified sitting judges could be successful, and that we may be 
close to losing the services of some really good and fair judges 
for reasons that have nothing to do with judicial merit.9 
As its title indicates, the CLE program was predicated on the idea of 
a “changing national landscape” that has altered the playing field upon 
which retention elections are conducted. To support this idea, program 
panelists discussed Supreme Court cases that have significantly impacted 
the conduct of retention campaigns and the financing of judicial 
elections.10 In addition, panelists presented and discussed evidence 
showing recent increases in campaign spending in both contested and 
retention elections, 11 as well as increases in attempts by state legislatures 
to eliminate judicial merit selection or otherwise reduce the independence 
of state courts.12 
However, the program did not fully explore one important topic: the 
actual results of retention elections. It offered a few summary statistics 
and touched upon recent high-profile retention controversies, but, due to 
its time and content limitations, it was unable to offer a comprehensive 
picture of election results or thoroughly assess whether or not retention 
voting patterns have shifted in recent years. This omits an important piece 
 
 8.  See generally ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1976 – 2016 RETENTION VOTE 
HISTORY (2016), www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/ 
retvotes16.pdf (showing a median approval rate of 61.2% in 2016 Alaska judicial 
retention election). 
 9.  CLE Program recording on Judicial Retention, supra note 2. 
 10.  Id. at 15:20 (discussing Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
(2002), where the Court held that Minnesota’s canon of judicial conduct 
prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing position on disputed 
legal or political issues violated the First Amendment; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010), striking down restricting corporate political speech; and Kansas v. 
Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016), where Justice Scalia speculated at oral argument that 
Kansans might vote against retaining state supreme court justices who did not 
support death penalty). 
 11.  Id. at 21:00 (discussing trends in retention campaign spending between 
2009 and 2014). 
 12.  Id. at 26:30 (highlighting Kansas state legislature’s efforts to reform 
courts). 
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of the overall picture, because the extent to which a retention candidate is 
at risk of removal in any single election depends fundamentally on the 
baseline level of support that a jurisdiction’s electorate gives its retention 
candidates in general. 
This Article will examine the results of retention elections in Alaska 
and nationwide, in order to assess the risk that Alaska’s retention 
candidates face and determine whether that risk is increasing. It will first 
present a national overview of past retention elections, and then will 
compare Alaska’s election results to those of the other retention states. 
Since Alaska is the only U.S. state to have employed the retention election 
method continuously since statehood, a comparative analysis of this kind 
has important implications not just for Alaska, but also for many other 
states where the debate over judicial selection methods is less settled. 
The data set used in this analysis has its origins in a 2005 doctoral 
dissertation that studied voting patterns in urban jurisdictions with long 
retention ballots. As the result of subsequent, ongoing research and data-
gathering through election websites, historical archives, government 
agencies and other sources, the data set now encompasses nearly the 
entire retention voting history of the United States, including all of the 
state-level trial and appellate courts in all of the retention states. 
I. RETENTION ELECTIONS NATIONWIDE 
Judicial retention elections were first proposed during the 
Progressive Era, a time when local political machines were able to exert 
considerable control over judicial systems.13  Reformers advocated a 
procedure under which councils of sitting judges would select new 
individuals to fill judicial vacancies by appointment, and the public 
would decide the fate of incumbents through a thumbs-up-thumbs-down 
vote without challengers.14 Such a system, the reformers argued, would 
minimize the influence of party politics over the judiciary while retaining 
a measure of accountability to the electorate.15 
The nation’s first retention elections were held in California in 1936, 
two years after the state’s voters approved a constitutional change to 
allow for retention elections for all appellate courts.16 Missouri followed 
 
 13.  See SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1−3 (1980); see also ALBERT KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 225–52 (1914) (overviewing methods of selecting judges); 
Albert Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 
BULL., 1914, at 29–52 (same). 
 14.  CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 13, at 1–3. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Gerald F. Uelmen, California Judicial Retention Elections, 28 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 333, 334−40, 344 (1988). 
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in 1942, debuting retention elections for all appellate courts and for most 
trial courts in the St. Louis and Kansas City regions. This reform was part 
of a comprehensive judicial selection plan known now commonly as the 
Missouri Plan,17 which Alaska uses today. Today there are twenty-two 
U.S. states in which at least some judges stand for retention in 
noncompetitive elections. Table 1 lists the states and the extent to which 
retention elections are used in each state. 
 
Table 1. Use of Retention Elections in U.S. States 
 
Appellate courts only: California, Florida, Maryland, Oklahoma,  
South Dakota, Tennessee 
 
All state courts: Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Montana*,  
Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wyoming 
 
Appellate courts and some trial courts: Arizona, Indiana, Kansas,  
Missouri 
 
Local courts of limited jurisdiction: Colorado (county), Georgia  
(Atlanta Municipal), Idaho (county), Kansas (county), Montana*  
(county), Nebraska (municipal, juvenile), New Mexico (Bernalillo  
County), Pennsylvania (Philadelphia Municipal and Traffic Courts),  
Utah (Justice Courts) 
 
 *Unopposed judges only 
 
All of the states except two require the approval of either 50% or a 
simple majority of participating voters to win retention. Illinois requires 
60%18 and New Mexico requires 57%.19 
As of 2017, a total of 14,418 retention elections have taken place for 
state trial and appellate judges in our nation’s history. More than 3000 
additional elections have been held for local courts of limited jurisdiction. 






 17.  Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 2005, 
72 MO. L. REV. 199, 202 (2007). 
 18.  10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7A-1 (WEST 2017). 
 19.  N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 33(A). 
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Table 2. Historical Retention Election Totals by State 
 

















Alaska 1962 449 5 1.11% 
Arizona 1976 1078 3 0.28% 
California 1936 698 3 0.43% 
Colorado 1970 1065 13 1.22% 
Florida 1978 432 0 0.00% 
Illinois 1964 2671 29 1.09% 
Indiana 1972 226 2 0.88% 
Iowa 1964 1617 7 0.43% 
Kansas 1960 1030 1 0.10% 
Maryland 1978 96 0 0.00% 
Missouri 1942 1288 3 0.23% 
Montana 1974 213 0 0.00% 
Nebraska 1964 903 7 0.78% 
New Mexico 1990 346 5 1.45% 
Oklahoma 1968 187 0 0.00% 
Pennsylvania 1969 1044 18 1.72% 
South Dakota 1984 20 0 0.00% 
Tennessee 1974 189 1 0.53% 
Utah 1970 584 2 0.34% 
Wyoming 1974 282 6 2.13% 
TOTALS  14,418 105 0.73% 
     
Note: Does not include local courts of limited jurisdiction.  
 
As the table illustrates, removals in retention elections are extremely 
rare occurrences, with more than 99% of judges winning retention. 
Retention rates in local courts likewise exceed 99%. 
Not only are removals infrequent, but they have become more 
infrequent in recent years. Table 3 reports the removal rates for state court 
judges nationwide by decade. It shows that fewer judges have been 







34.2 ARTICLE - KLUMPP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2017  5:33 PM 
2017 JUDICIAL RETENTION 149 
Table 3. Retention Election Defeats by Decade 
 
  Candidates Defeats Rate 
pre-1970 688 2 0.29% 
1970-1979 1647 20 1.21% 
1980-1989 2513 25 0.99% 
1990-1999 3127 34 1.09% 
2000-2009 3568 13 0.36% 
2010-2016 2875 11 0.38% 
 
 Moreover, although not shown in the table, more than two-thirds of 
the thirty-four retention defeats in the 1990s occurred between 1990 and 
1992. So in the past quarter-century, removals have been much less 
common than during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. 
The most important and consequential retention elections are those 
of supreme court justices and other statewide judges, so those election 
results warrant a more detailed examination. The data for statewide 
judges reveals a removal rate that is slightly higher than the removal rate 
for trial court judges, but not substantially so. A total of eleven state 
supreme court justices have been removed out of the 809 who have sought 
retention since 1936, a rate of 1.36%. One defeat occurred in 1964;20 three 
in 1986;21 three in the 1990s;22 one in 2005;23 and three in 2010.24 
Beyond simple counts of successes and failures, much more can be 
learned by examining variations in approval rates, since approval rates 
can show changes over time and across jurisdictions with more 
sensitivity. Figure 1 charts the approval rates for statewide judges in the 
nineteen retention states that elect at least some judges statewide. Each 
line represents the approval rates in a single state, and each data point 
represents the median approval rate for all statewide judges on the same  
 
 20.  Randy M. Olsen, Harry O. Arend: Alaska Bar Controversy Claims First Judge, 
ALASKA BAR ASS’N, https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/bar_ 
controversy_claims_harry_arend_s_judgeship_at_statehood.html (last visited 
October 13, 2017). 
 21.  See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California 
Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 
JUDICATURE 348, 349–55 (1987). 
 22.  See generally Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons 
From the Defeats of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70−72 (1999); 
Marilyn S. Kite, Wyoming’s Judicial Selection Process: Is It Getting the Job Done? 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 214−25 (2007). 
 23.  Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, Lessons From an Unusual Retention 
Election, 43 CT. REV. 6, 6−7 (2006). 
 24.  Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715, 716−18 (2011). 
34.2 ARTICLE - KLUMPP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2017  5:33 PM 





34.2 ARTICLE - KLUMPP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2017  5:33 PM 
2017 JUDICIAL RETENTION 151 
ballot. Using medians allows for a broader overview of general rates and 
trends and reduces the impact of controversies involving individual 
judges (which are addressed separately below). 
Figure 1 reveals three important characteristics about retention 
voting. First, baseline levels of support for judges vary widely among 
states. In some states, judges are routinely supported by 80% or more of 
the electorate, while approval is barely above 60% in other states. While 
retention elections have long been perceived as a guarantee of lifetime 
employment for judges, Figure 1 makes clear that judges in some states 
are much more vulnerable to removal than in others. 
Second, during the 1970s there was a gradual decline in baseline 
approval rates. This decline is easier to see in trial-court data sets, which 
offer more jurisdictions and more candidates to study. But in most of the 
states employing retention elections throughout the 1970s, approval rates 
were lower at the end of the decade than at the beginning—in some cases 
by nearly double-digit margins—and have never fully recovered. 
Subsequent research noted a parallel between this decline and a 
decline in “political trust” as defined by questions on a periodic 
nationwide opinion poll.25 Unfortunately, specific polling about judicial 
elections has always been extremely rare. There are no known data 
sources from those years that could help determine whether or not any of 
the 1970s decline was specific to attitudes towards the judiciary.  
Third, retention voting appears to be heavily dependent on at least 
one particular aspect of voter attitude towards government: support for 
incumbents. In the 1990 election, a grassroots anti-incumbent campaign 
against the U.S. Congress ended up having a huge spillover effect on 
incumbents at all levels of government, with incumbents defeated in 









 25.  See Larry T. Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 
JUDICATURE 79 (1999) (illustrating a positive correlation between political trust and 
affirmative vote in judicial retention elections); see also Larry T. Aspin et al., Thirty 
Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4–5 (2000). 
 26.  See Albert J. Klumpp, Judicial Retention Elections in Cook County: 
Exercise of Democracy, or Exercise in Futility? 111–21, 160 (Mar. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with the 
University of Illinois at Chicago Library). 
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2010, this time for more partisan reasons. Major polls measured strong 
anti-incumbent sentiment, and an unusual number of congressional 
incumbents lost their seats.27 
Figure 1 shows sudden, noticeable drops in support for retention 
judges nationwide in both 1990 and 2010 that coincide with the anti-
incumbent attitudes and events in those years. Again, specific polling 
data on judicial voting is not available to link these drops to a specific 
cause. But given that retention candidates are the most easily identifiable 
incumbents on most election ballots, and given that no alternative 
explanation has ever emerged for the sudden approval rate shifts in either 
year, there is a strong basis for connecting anti-incumbent sentiment with 
these judicial retention voting events. 
The bottom line remains that the defeat of a retention candidate is a 
rare occurrence. But in light of the fact that so much variation exists from 
place to place and over time, does Alaska’s retention history suggest that 
its current judges are facing any unusual risk of removal? 
II. ALASKA RETENTION ELECTION RESULTS AND THE 
VULNERABILITY OF ALASKA CANDIDATES 
The most important aspect of Alaska’s retention history is an 
exceptionally low level of electoral support for judges. Table 4 is based on 
the same data used in Figure 1 above, and compares the same U.S. states. 
The table reports median approval rates for statewide retention 
candidates over the past twenty years. Of the nineteen states in the table, 






 27.  Gary Langer, Poll: 2010 Midterm Elections: Incumbent Support Lowest Since 
1994, ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/2010_ 
Elections/poll-2010_Elections/poll-2010-midterm-elections-incumbent-support-
lowest-1994/story?id=10487480 (focusing on results of an ABC News-
Washington Post poll suggesting anti-incumbent sentiment ahead of 2010 mid-
term elections); Ryan McClafferty, What Will the “Anti-Incumbent Frenzy” Mean for 
2010?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2010/02/what-will-the-anti-incumbent-frenzy-mean-for-2010/36345/ 
(considering high anti-incumbent sentiment in advance of 2010 midterm 
elections); see generally Drew DeSilver, Public’s Anti-Incumbent Mood Hasn’t Always 
Predicted Big Electoral Swings, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/05/publics-anti-incumbent-
mood-hasn’t-always-predicted-big-electoral-swings/ (discussing levels of anti-
incumbent attitudes in recent years and the defeats of fifty-eight House of 
Representatives incumbents in 2010). 
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Table 4. Median Approval Rates,  










































        Maryland 85.5% 
        South Dakota 82.2% 
        Montana 80.9% 
        Utah 80.8% 
        Wyoming 78.2% 
        Arizona 76.4% 
        New Mexico 73.9% 
        Nebraska 72.8% 
        Iowa 72.7% 
        Pennsylvania 71.9% 
        Kansas 71.6% 
        Colorado 71.4% 
        Tennessee 71.3% 
        Indiana 71.2% 
        California 70.2% 
        Florida 67.8% 
        Missouri 67.6% 
        Oklahoma 66.5% 
        Alaska 63.4% 
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Table 5 provides a more complete picture of Alaska’s retention 
results. It reports median approval rates for all retention candidates for 
both appellate and trial courts, separated by district and by decade. The 
table reveals two important facts. First, approval rates vary somewhat 
across the state, with northern and southern voters supporting candidates 
at higher rates than in the Anchorage and Fairbanks districts. Differences 
of this sort are not uncommon, particularly in larger states where different 
regions can have different political climates. 
 
Table 5. Median Approval Rates by Judicial District and Decade 
 
 Judicial District 
 1 2 3 4 Appellate 
  Years (Juneau) (Northern) (Anchorage) (Fairbanks) (Statewide) 
  1962-   
  1978 76.8% 86.0% 72.8% 73.0% 67.5% 
 
  1980- 
  1988 72.4% 74.7% 66.3% 68.4% 66.1% 
 
  1990- 
  1998 73.2% 72.8% 64.9% 67.5% 64.8% 
 
  2000-   
  2008 75.1% 67.4% 66.5% 70.3% 63.8% 
 
  2010- 
  2016 74.6% 72.8% 62.4% 66.0% 60.5% 
 
Table 5 also reveals a general decline in approval rates over time, 
most noticeably for statewide judges. While not consistent across all 
districts and decades, overall the state’s retention candidates are receiving 
lower approval rates than in the past. As noted above, approval rates 
declined in most states during the 1970s, but Table 5 suggests a continuing 
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In the last thirty years, only two Alaska judges have been removed 
in retention elections, and both were exceptional cases involving not only 
negative performance evaluations but also negative media coverage 
pertaining to professional misconduct.28 Nevertheless, the figures in 
Tables 4 and 5 show that Alaska judges and their supporters have good 
reason for concern. Because the state’s baseline approval rates are at such 
low levels and show a sustained decline over time, Alaskan retention 
candidates are more vulnerable to removal than candidates in other 
retention states for reasons that may have little or nothing to do with their 
performance.  
The type of anti-incumbent surge described above is just one factor 
that becomes a greater concern in Alaska as approval rates decline. Based 
on the magnitudes of the shifts in Alaska in 1990 and 2010, and on the 
figures in Table 5, a similar event occurring in 2018 would not in itself 
cause the removal of any judges. But particularly for statewide judges and 
judges in the Anchorage and Fairbanks districts, the danger will grow 
over time if approval rates continue to decrease. 
Another type of negative surge that can occur in retention voting is 
a protest vote against an entire state judicial system because of a high-
profile supreme court controversy. For the most part, controversies 
involving individual retention candidates have little or no effect on 
approval rates for other candidates sharing the same ballots. On several 
occasions, though, a contentious issue involving a state supreme court 
produced a substantial scorched-earth vote in a subsequent election that 
impacted not only the supreme court retention candidates on the ballot 
but also all of the lower-court candidates as well. Most notably, this 
phenomenon occurred in California in 1966, after a court decision striking 
down a property rights initiative,29 and in Iowa in 2010, after a decision 
that legalized gay marriage in the state.30 In both instances, all of the 
retention candidates in the following retention election received 
significantly lower approval rates than expected based on previous 
elections. A similar vote occurred in Pennsylvania in 2005 after the state 
legislature approved a substantial pay raise for state judges and other 
government officials that had been proposed by the supreme court’s chief 
 
 28.  See Matt Volz, Panel Comes Down Hard Against Judge, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1; Matt Volz, Judicial Commission Charges Kenai Judge with 
Misconduct, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Oct. 1, 2006), http://juneauempire.com/stories/ 
100106/sta_20061001001.shtml#.Wey1P4Zrw1I; Megan Holland, Ethics Complaint 
Filed Against Judge, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, May 5, 2010, at A3; Patti Epler, Ousted 
Anchorage Judge Sues Courts, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), 
https://www.adn.com/anchorage/article/ousted-anchorage-judge-sues-
courts/2010/12/08/. 
 29.  Wold & Culver, supra note 21, at 349–55. 
 30.  Pettys, supra note 24, 716−18. 
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justice.31 In none of these three instances were any lower-court candidates 
removed from the bench, but this was in part because the baseline 
approval rates in their jurisdictions were much higher than those in 
Alaska. In short, Alaska’s low approval rates leave all of its retention 
candidates particularly vulnerable to political controversies that involve 
the judiciary. 
Low Alaska approval rates have similar consequences for targeted 
votes against specific judges. In general, there are three categories of 
events that will cause voters to target a particular retention candidate for 
removal: an anti-retention campaign; a negative assessment from a bar 
association, newspaper, or government commission that evaluates 
candidates; or a disclosure of unfavorable information about a judge’s 
personal life or professional conduct that occurs close enough to election 
day for voters to remember it. The history of retention elections provides 
numerous examples of all three categories.32 As it turns out, the subject of 
targeted retention voting is of particular importance in Alaska. In part, 
this is because the state’s low baseline approval rates increase the 
likelihood that a targeted vote of a given magnitude will result in 
removal. But there is also the matter of frequency—how likely it is that a 
judge will be targeted at all. Historical data can shed light on that 
question. 
III. DOUBLE-DIGIT SPREADS IN ALASKA RETENTION VOTING 
An extremely useful metric in studying retention voting is the 
“double-digit spread.” A double-digit spread occurs when the approval 
rates of two judges on the same retention ballot differ by ten percentage 
points or more. It also occurs when the approval rates of a single judge or 
entire group of judges on a ballot differ from expected rates by ten 
percentage points or more (based on rates in previous and subsequent 
elections). The metric is useful any targeted voting on a retention voting 
is almost always negative. It is exceedingly rare for any individual 
retention candidate to receive significantly more positive votes than other 
judges on the same ballot. Accordingly, identifying and studying 
instances of double-digit spreads provides insight into targeted voting 
against retention candidates, regardless of whether or not the targeted 





 31.  Goodman & Marks, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
 32.  See, e.g., Klumpp, supra note 26, at 143–55, 181–82, 190, 197–99. 
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Table 6 displays the frequency of double-digit spreads in retention 
states. The states are listed from highest to lowest in frequency. Alaska 
ranks second-highest of the twenty states with a rate of 6%, indicating that 
its retention candidates are among the most frequently targeted by voters 
for removal. 
 





  Candidates Spreads Rate 
Arizona 1078 68 6.3% 
Alaska 449 27 6.0% 
Wyoming 282 16 5.7% 
Illinois 2671 150 5.6% 
Pennsylvania 1044 58 5.6% 
California 698 36 5.2% 
South Dakota 20 1 5.0% 
Colorado 1065 44 4.1% 
New Mexico 346 14 4.0% 
Nebraska 903 26 2.9% 
Montana 213 6 2.8% 
Kansas 1030 29 2.8% 
Iowa 1617 30 1.9% 
Indiana 226 4 1.8% 
Missouri 1288 18 1.4% 
Tennessee 189 2 1.1% 
Utah 584 6 1.0% 
Oklahoma 187 1 0.5% 
Florida 432 0 0.0% 
Maryland 96 0 0.0% 
 
Alaska is exceptional not only for its frequency of double-digit 
spreads but also for their causes. As might be expected, some of the 
spreads were caused by performance ratings. Twelve of the twenty-seven 
Alaska spreads can be linked at least in part to negative ratings by the 
Alaska Judicial Council, or by bar associations in the years before the 
Council’s inception. Remarkably though, most of the others were the 
result of anti-retention campaigns, notwithstanding positive Alaska Bar 
Association or Alaska Judicial Council ratings. The only other state in 
 
 
34.2 ARTICLE - KLUMPP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2017  5:33 PM 
158 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:2 
which anti-retention campaigns have had such a frequent impact is 
Pennsylvania—and unlike any of the other retention states,  Pennsylvania 
holds its retention elections in odd-numbered years—when there are 
many fewer offices and issues competing for the electorate’s attention.33  
In addition to campaigns that produced double-digit spreads, 
biennial reports produced by the Alaska Judicial Council have noted 
instances of other campaigns that have had smaller electoral impacts and 
that were partly or fully neutralized by counter-campaigns.34 A 
comprehensive historical catalog of anti-retention campaigns does not yet 
exist from which to cite figures on numbers of campaigns, but it suffices 
to say that Alaska is highly unusual in the frequency of campaigns against 
the retention of judges, especially trial court judges. 
CONCLUSION 
Is there in fact a “changing national landscape” that has placed 
Alaska’s judicial retention candidates in greater peril of removal than in 
the past? In many ways, yes. Particularly at the supreme court level, there 
have been more frequent efforts in recent years to remove more judges in 
more states. Campaign laws have changed, wealthy contributors and 
special interests are more involved than in the past, and campaign 
spending in supreme court retention elections is steadily increasing.35 In 
retention elections, more judges find themselves having to campaign or 
organize campaigns on their behalf, if only as a preemptive measure. 
Nevertheless, there has not been a significant change in the outcomes 
of retention elections nationally. Removals remain rare and in fact are 
rarer than in the past.36 The baseline approval rates in most of the 
retention states have also remained relatively stable.37 Similarly, the 
frequency of double-digit spreads, reported in Table 7, remains well 





 33.  Albert J. Klumpp, Odd vs. Even: Is Low Retention Election Turnout a Function 
of Odd-Year Scheduling? 35 PENN. LAWYER 18 (2013). 
 34.  See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT: 2009-2010 TO 
THE LEGISLATURE AND SUPREME COURT (2011); ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TWENTY-
SIXTH REPORT: 2011-2012 TO THE LEGISLATURE AND SUPREME COURT (2013). 
 35.  See generally Scott Greytak et al., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013-2014 1–4 (2015), https://www.brennancenter 
.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Politics_of_Judicial_Election_2
013_2014.pdf. 
 36.  See supra Table 2. 
 37.  See supra Figure 1. 
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Table 7. Double-Digit Spreads by Decade 
 




pre-1970 688 18 2.62% 
1970-1979 1647 102 6.19% 
1980-1989 2513 118 4.70% 
1990-1999 3127 111 3.55% 
2000-2009 3568 91 2.55% 
2010-2016 2875 97 3.37% 
 
Some of the credit for this stability certainly goes to the kinds of 
counter-campaigns that were discussed at the May 2017 CLE program. 
But campaign activities notwithstanding, the analysis presented here 
shows that Alaska’s judges face a significant danger that judges in most 
other states do not: low baseline approval rates that leave them at greater 
risk of removal. And this danger is neither new nor nationwide, but rather 
is long-established and Alaska-specific. 
 Alaska legal historian Pamela Cravez, writing about a prominent 
territorial lawyer named Wendell Kay, shed some insight into the pre-
statehood attitude of Alaskans towards their legal system: 
Kay, like many lawyers who came to Alaska while it was still a 
territory, became an expert at appealing to community norms 
over the law. Not surprising, since from the time of its purchase 
in 1867 to statehood in 1959, Alaskans developed a great 
skepticism of laws provided them . . . Alaska’s territorial 
lawyers understood the gap between [what] laws provided 
Alaskans and what their communities were willing to enforce.38 
Cravez also described Anchorage juries of the 1940s as exhibiting 
“an independence of spirit, their verdicts relying more on a lawyer’s 
dramatic performance and appeal to pragmatism than on the letter of the 
law.”39 These passages, although dealing with pre-statehood years, 
suggest an electorate that would tend to be less friendly than others 
towards the judicial system as an institution, and more receptive to 




 38.  PAMELA CRAVEZ, THE BIGGEST DAMNED HAT: TALES FROM ALASKA’S 
TERRITORIAL LAWYERS AND JUDGES 1–2 (2017). 
 39.  Id. at 88. 
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That characterization is supported by the findings herein. As much 
as Alaska has grown and changed since statehood, Alaska’s unusually 
low level of baseline support for retention candidates indicates that the 
same attitude towards the judiciary apparently remains at least to some 
extent. 
The purpose of this Article is definitely not to argue that any 
particular judge should or should not be retained, or that a vote for or 
against a retention candidate for whatever reason is right or wrong. But 
to the extent that some Alaskans are concerned about the fate of judges 
who prove themselves worthy of retention, this Article has shown that 
addressing the significant, deep-rooted negative attitude in the state’s 
electorate is every bit as important as the more empirical issues involved 
in conducting judicial campaigns, and arguably more so. Particularly if 
the state’s approval rates continue to slowly decline, retention candidates 
viewed as “competent and qualified” will face a greater and greater risk 
of being voted off the bench, either because of anti-retention campaigns 
or as collateral damage from an anti-incumbent or scorched-earth protest 
votes. 
Very little is known about why voters support or oppose retention 
candidates in general.  In the absence of controversies that generate public 
attention or significant campaign activity, retention elections tend to be 
low-visibility affairs and the candidates remain largely or entirely 
unknown to the voters who decide their fates. Any effort to address 
Alaska’s low approval rates and improve the prospects for future 
candidates should begin with an attempt to learn why voters choose 
“yes” or “no” as their default vote when presented with an unfamiliar 
name. A better understanding of this could substantially affect the 
“changing national landscape” and improve the prospects of qualified 
candidates in Alaska and every other retention state. 
 
